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Imagine that only the state can meet the need for housing
but decides not to do so. Unsurprisingly, participants in a vi-
gnette experiment deem this scenario unjust. Hence, justice rat-
ings increase when the living situation improves. To a lesser ex-
tent, this also holds beyond the need threshold, understood as the
minimum amount necessary for a decent life. Surprisingly, how-
ever, the justice evaluation function is highly convex below this
point. The resulting S-shaped curve is akin to the value function
in prospect theory, with the need threshold providing the point
of reference and inflection. A control treatment without needs-
information supports this interpretation. Needs-information fur-
thermore compresses the perceived injustice of arbitrary inequality.
As in prospect theory, such reference dependency suggests biases
in judgment and decision making. A consequence may be that the
lot of the poorest in society does not receive the attention it would
otherwise get.
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1 Introduction
Satisfying basic needs plays an important role in conceptions of social justice
(Reader, 2005) and as a policy goal (Boarini and Mira d'Ercole, 2006; Esping-
Andersen, 1990). A basic need can be understood as an amount of some
good that a member of society requires in order not to suffer (Miller, 1999).
Because of their fundamental nature, basic needs have also been proposed
by many as the principal normative grounding for human rights (e.g., Brock,
2005; Gasper, 2005; Hassoun, 2008; Renzo, 2015).
Some needs are biological (e.g., the amount of calories a person should
consume every day), while many others are social in nature (e.g., the amount of
money necessary to participate in social life). What separates needs from mere
wants is that the former are based on a socially shared understanding (Miller,
1999). An individual may have such a strong preference for eating bluefin
tuna that she feels in pain whenever it is not part of her menu. For this want
to become a need, however, others must acknowledge that eating bluefin tuna
is necessary for her not to suffer (which in this case seems fairly unlikely). As
an inter-subjectively acknowledged threshold, needs provide a fundamentally
different basis of social justice than other principles, such as egalitarianism,
equity theory, utilitarianism as well as the Rawlsian maximin or the Pareto
principle, which dominate the literature on distributional preferences (see e.g.,
Konow, 2003).
What sets need-based justice apart from the latter is its defining question:
Do people have enough (Frankfurt, 2015) in order to lead a minimally decent
life (Miller, 1999)? This question shows the noncomparative (Feinberg, 1974)
thrust of need-based justice: It is first of all human suffering, due to unfulfilled
needs, that causes injustice, not how one is treated relative to others. This
raises the question precisely how justice is related to need fulfillment. While
it seems straightforward to characterize a situation as being just when the
needs of all members of society are fulfilled, it is much less obvious how to
evaluate situations that depart from this unlikely state of the world.
The main reason for this gap lies in the focus of most accounts of social
justice on the comparative dimension of justice, i.e., how one person's due is
related to how much other members of society receive. This is clearly an im-
portant endeavor and a focus on needs does not make it obsolete (the compar-
ative dimension is always present when members of society differ in important
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aspects and need considerations stop carrying much weight when everyone's
needs are fulfilled). However, there seems to have been little progress on
reaching common principles of comparative justice accepted by involved par-
ties with their differing interests and their selfishly biased perceptions. The
hope of a need-based account of justice, however partial it may be, lies in
its potential capability to reach a consensus, even among involved parties,
that harm should be avoided, regardless of a suffering person's desert, status
or responsibility. The silence in the literature on the relationship between
need fulfillment and justice is therefore an important gap: If all we can say is
that unnecessary suffering is unjust, how can we differentiate between situa-
tions with different levels of suffering or decide between situations that involve
trade-offs between members of society?
In this paper, we try to partly fill this gap. We will first introduce a concep-
tual framework in which we will try to make theories of social justice speak
about the relationship between need fulfillment and justice. Here, we focus
solely on the noncomparative dimension of need-based justice, hitherto largely
neglected in both the empirical and the normative literature (the recent and
ongoing exceptions on the normative side will be covered in the next section).
Against this background, we will then present empirical data based on eval-
uations of laypersons who act as impartial spectators. As many have argued
(see e.g., the discussion in Konow, 2003), the impartial views of real people
are an important foundation for a normative theory. Asking laypersons helps
the philosopher to go beyond and possibly question her own pre-theoretical
intuitions. Not the least, for a theory of justice to be capable of reaching a
consensus, it has to be accepted by non-experts. The empirical part relies on
vignette experiments. They have become the de facto methodological stan-
dard for empirical justice research because they promise both experimental
control about predictor variables (in our case: need fulfillment) and external
validity for situations that, for ethical or practical reasons, can not be studied
in real-life situations (see Bardsley et al., 2009, for overviews see Traub et al.,
2005; Gaertner and Schokkaert, 2012). This clearly applies to research on
human needs. While this paper is not the first to empirically study the role
of needs for justice evaluations (starting with Yaari and Bar-Hillel, 1984, for
an overview see Kittel and Traub, 2018), we are not aware of any empirical
work, nor a conceptual framework for that matter, that can shed light on the
precise relationship between need fulfillment and justice evaluations.
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2 Conceptual framework
Needs become a question of justice whenever society holds at least some re-
sponsibility for the need fulfillment of its members. If, for instance, a situa-
tion of unfulfilled needs comes about through sheer misfortune and without
anyone being able to alleviate suffering (e.g., a person is ship-wrecked on a
deserted island), one would be hard pressed to speak of an injustice. If, how-
ever, there are plausible counterfactual scenarios in which needs would be
fulfilled if other decisions would be or had been taken (e.g., other economic
or social policies) unfulfilled needs become a matter of justice (for a further
elaboration on theoften not straightforwarddistinction between injustice
and misfortune see Shklar, 1990). Bearing an element of human responsibil-
ity in mind, a situation of unfulfilled needs can be deemed less just than a
situation in which needs are fulfilled (Kipnis and Meyers, 1985). To formal-
ize this statement, consider a society with homogeneous members, i.e., with
equal need thresholds (ν) and equal endowments (ω) of some important good
that is considered necessary for a decent life in society. The justice evalu-
ation function J can then be said to be rising in the level of endowment:
J ′(ω) > 0, for ω ≤ ν, with the need threshold assumed to be constant. This
follows straightforwardly from several accounts of justice which acknowledge
a noncomparative dimension of justice, such as utilitarianism (e.g., Mill, 1998;
Bentham, 2009); prioritarianism (e.g., Parfit, 1997), which puts extra weight
on the well-being of those suffering; and sufficientarianism (Frankfurt, 1987;
Crisp, 2003; Schramme, 2006). It may even be deduced from the writings of
Plato and Cicero (see Siebel, 2017). This monotonic relationship is also part of
recent and related works by Siebel (2017), Springhorn (2017) as well as Traub
et al. (2017) on the measurement of need-based justicetheir models can,
however, lead to different results in cases (that are not considered here) where
improved need fulfillment increases inequality between members of society.
There are two more interesting questions on the noncomparative relationship
between need fulfillment and justice: First, how does J(ω) look like beyond
the need threshold? Second, how is justice rising below the threshold, i.e.,
what can be said about J ′′(ω), for ω ≤ ν?
For utilitarianism, the answer to the first question is obvious: As long as
there is extra utility from a better endowment, the just thing is to provide it,
i.e., J(ω) is rising also in situations of oversupply (i.e., for ω > ν) up to a pos-
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sible bliss point beyond which further endowment creates a disutility (such
as overeating food). For sufficientarianism, by contrast, enough is enough.
For this line of sufficiency, a person's need is the most plausible candidate.
Therefore, J(ω) may not rise beyond ν. The dedicated measures of need-
based justice by Siebel (2017), Springhorn (2017) and Traub et al. (2017) also
all agree that need -based justice can no longer differentiate between situa-
tions in which the needs of all members of society are always fulfilled, again
implying that J(ω) reaches a plateau when ω > ν. However, this does not
preclude other considerations, such as utilitarianism, to enter. Roger Crisp's
(2003) account of sufficientarianism can be understood along these lines and
suggests utility maximization beyond the sufficiency line (see Arneson, 2002).
Therefore, justice evaluations may increase even beyond the need threshold.
To answer the second question, some interpretation is in order. From the
perspective of utilitarianism, justice rises in pleasure and falls in pain; more
generally, it increases in a person's utility. For the lack of compelling alterna-
tives, let us assume a linear mapping from utility to justice. Consequently, the
relationship between endowment and utility determines the functional form
of J(ω). The dominant assumption for this relationship is that of diminishing
marginal returns. Putting these elements together suggests a concave relation-
ship between endowment and justice, i.e., J ′′(ω) < 0. The same conclusion
could, unsurprisingly, also be drawn from the perspective of prioritarianism,
which gives more weight to the utility of those who are badly off. According
to Arneson (2002), injustice is therefore directly linked to a person's suffering
(and not to the level of inequality), which is getting progressively worse the
lower the endowment is. Concavity is also the cornerstone of Jasso's work on
distributive justice, which posits that justice evaluations are well described
by the logarithm of the ratio between actual reward over just reward. While
the logarithm was first a purely empirical result based on vignette studies
(e.g., Jasso, 1978), she later argued for it axiomatically (Jasso, 1990), albeit
with little reference to normative theories of justice. As Jasso does not ex-
plicitly restrict the domain of just rewards, her theory seems, prima facie, a
candidate for measuring need-based justice (see Springhorn, 2017 and Siebel,
2017 for a critical discussion of this approach). This would imply a concave
relationship between endowment and justice and is indeed also explicitly mod-
eled, as part of their own measures of need-based justice, by both Springhorn
(2017) and Siebel (2017). Concavity is also assumed in Traub et al. (2017).
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Sufficientarianism, by contrast, might give a different answer by putting a
particular moral significance on a person reaching the sufficiency line. In the
most extreme form, this suggest a jump in J(ω) at the need threshold from its
minimum to its maximum value. In any case, sufficientarianism would give
us a convex instead of a concave relationship between need fulfillment and
justice for all ω ≤ ν : J ′′(ω) > 0.
Lastly, note that any purely comparative notion of justice, such as egalitari-
anism, implies a flat justice evaluation at its maximum value since households
are always treated equally. The implausibility of this implication is precisely
what drives the leveling-down objection (Nozick, 1974; Raz, 1986; Temkin,
1993) against egalitarianism and shows that we also need an explicit treat-
ment of the noncomparative dimension of need-based justice.
3 Design of the study
In the main treatment (Needs) of our vignette study, we ask subjects to
imagine that only the state can meet people's need for housing. Depending
on the scenario, the state may or may not decide to do so. Needs are presented
as a fictitious amount of living space (1,000 units per household) that residents
of the region consider necessary for a decent life. Participants are told that
space of this size means to live in close quarters but is just enough to lead
a decent life. They are also informed that households do not differ in any
other meaningful way (ruling out considerations of, e.g., desert) and prefer
more to less living space. The means at the state's disposal are sufficient to
build up to 2,000 units per household. See the exact wording of the vignette
in the Appendix. In the control treatment (No Needs), the vignette is the
same apart from the parts that relate to needs, which are taken out.
Subjects rate 11 scenarios that differ in the endowment with living space
provided by the state for each household. The endowment ranges from 0 to
2,000 units in steps of 200 units. There are two different rating tasks: In
the global rating task, subjects rate each scenario separately on a scale from
0 to 100%, where 100% is presented as perfectly just and lower numbers
mean correspondingly lower degrees of justice. In the relative rating task,
subjects evaluate the perceived difference in justice between two scenarios
that are adjacent in terms of endowment (e.g., 0 vs. 200 units) on a 11-points
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Likert scale. On this scale, 1 represents indifference (equally just / unjust)
while 11 means that one scenario is deemed much more just. There are two
different versions of both treatments, each given to half of the participants.
The most important differences concern the sequence in which the endowments
are presented, either ascending or descending, which of the two rating tasks
came first and the intital slider position in the global rating task, either left
or right. The two versions aim to control for order and anchoring effects.
The study was run with 116 participants of the WiSo experimental lab-
oratory at the University of Hamburg in 2016, in a subject pool consisting
largely (93%) of students of various disciplines, with a median age of 25 years
at the time of the study and slightly more self-identified females among those
76% of participants who responded to the gender question (56% female, 42%
male, 2% other). With respect to their own living situation, the median liv-
ing space per person reported by the participants is about 27 square meters.
Participants were invited through the software hroot (Bock et al., 2014), and
the survey was implemented with LimeSurvey. Participants received a flat
payment of 10 Euros for taking part in a session that took about one hour
and consisted of the study described here as well as another part related to
need-based justice. The latter part was only administered and introduced
after the present study and could therefore not have had any influence on it.
4 Results
We start by looking at the rating in the global rating task in the main treat-
ment.1
The mean justice ratings in Figure 1 reveal several results. First, study
participants agree to a large extent that not providing any housing is unjust
(in fact, more than 95% of participants evaluate this scenario with the mini-
mum value of 0) and therefore reject a purely comparative notion of justice.
Second, justice evaluations consequently increase when households' lot is be-
1For all analyses of the global rating task, we drop 7 out of the 116 observations (5
in Needs and 2 in NoNeeds) because they left the sliders for all scenarios at their
starting positions. As these 7 subjects also had the fastest response times, they most
likely accidentally or purposefully left the screen without attempting any evaluation.
Dropping these observations should therefore improve data quality. However, the basic
results reported here would not change if we included them. Note furthermore that all
observations are included in the pairwise rating task because subjects had to make a
choice before being able to proceed.
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Figure 1: Mean justice ratings (Needs treatment)
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ing improved. This holds true, albeit to a lesser extent, beyond the need
threshold. Therefore, subjects do not subscribe to a version of sufficientari-
anism that sees questions of justice to end when needs are met. Fourth and
most interestingly, justice evaluations rise over-proportionally below the need
threshold. The jump in justice ratings from about 27% to about 70% when
endowment rises from 800 to the need threshold of 1,000 units is particularly
striking. Overall, the justice evaluations are best described by an S-shaped
sigmoid function, with a point of inflection at the need threshold. Before we
dig deeper into interpreting and explaining the s-shape, we first note that all
four results pass tests of statistical significance, as can be seen from table 1.
The panel Tobit regression, which takes into account the large extent of
censored data at both the minimum and maximum of the response scale (30%
at 0 and 22% at 100, respectively) and deals with the nested data-structure,
confirms the visual inspection. In this regression, the variable below endow-
ment is coded as 1 for all endowments up to the need threshold of 1,000
units. Therefore, the variable endowment captures the effect of increasing
endowment on justice evaluations in the domain of oversupply. If we fit the
relationship between endowment and justice evaluation only linearly, as in
model 1, we find a statistically highly significant positive coefficient. This
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model 1 model 2
variables justice evaluation justice evaluation
endowment 0.927*** 1.434***
(0.0414) (0.127)
not above threshold * endowment 0.156*** -1.293***
(0.0537) (0.224)
endowment2 -0.00353***
(0.000591)
not above threshold * endowment2 0.0131***
(0.00230)
constant -52.88*** -41.58***
(6.651) (7.879)
panel level standard deviation 25.28*** 25.03***
(3.289) (3.130)
standard deviation of the error term 36.63*** 32.44***
(1.752) (1.555)
observations 572 572
number of participants 52 52
standard errors in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
Table 1: Panel Tobit Regression (Needs treatment)
coefficient becomes even larger for endowments up to the need threshold, as
shown by the statistically significant positive coefficient of the dummy variable
not above threshold.
In model 2, we allow for quadratic effects. As it turns out, in the oversupply
domain, the quadratic term (endowment2) is negative and statistically signif-
icant, which implies a concave relationship between endowment and justice
evaluations. Up to the need threshold, by contrast, the quadratic relationship
between endowment and justice ratings is positive: the linear combination of
endowment2 and not above threshold * endowment2 (.0096) is highly signifi-
cantly different from zero (p< .001). This highlights the convex relationship
that was already apparent from Figure 1.
This convex relationship below the threshold is at odds with the impli-
cations of utilitarianism, prioritarianism, and recent theories of need-based
justice (Siebel, 2017; Springhorn, 2017; Traub et al., 2017). It may be inter-
preted in sufficientarian lines but seems normatively problematic. The convex
relationship in line with the sufficientarian doctrine implies that a marginal
improvement that puts individuals at the sufficiency line should be preferred
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to larger improvements strictly below this line. It seems difficult to imagine
that individuals themselves would have such risk-loving preferences implied by
this doctrine. By contrast, a concave relationship suggested by other accounts
of justice puts priority on the direst situations. Furthermore, a concave rela-
tionship could also explain (endogenously) a preference for equality without
requiring the assumption that inequality is bad per se, because improving the
lot of the worst-off has moral precedence over improving the situation of the
better off.
Before proceeding further, it is important to rule out that the convex func-
tional form is not an artifact of measurement on one global scale that is bound
from below and above or of aggregation. Concerning the method of measure-
ment, Figure 2 depicts the results of the relative rating task, which provides
subjects for every pair-wise comparison with a new scale. Since participants
first had to decide which of the two levels of endowment they perceived as
more just and then the magnitude of the difference on an 11-points Likert
scale, the scale effectively runs from -10 to +10, with negative values indicat-
ing that the smaller endowment was judged as more just. The graph displays
the marginal increases in justice evaluations starting from the lower level,
i.e., the first point on the left of the graph shows that participants, on aver-
age, judged an endowment of 200 as about 1 point on the Likert scale more
just than an endowment of 0. Figure 2 corroborates the two main results of
the global rating task: first, justice ratings are monotonically increasing even
beyond the need threshold (the marginal ratings are all highly significantly
different from zero based on a one-sample t-test); second, reassuringly for our
experimental design but not for most normative theories, there is again a con-
vex relationship between endowment and justice ratings below the threshold.
While marginal increases in justice are flat up an endowment of 600 (p-values
of a paired t-test are all considerably larger than .1), they rise when approach-
ing the need threshold (p < .001) and then fall again (p < .001) before leveling
off to a virtually flat curve (all p-values are considerably larger than .1).
The second worry is that justice may be a binary construct (distinguishing
only between just and unjust) for some but not for others such that once we
aggregate over the responses of different participants, we get the S-shaped
function. The individual-level graphs displayed in the Appendix show that
only three participants (about 6%) make judgments of only 0% or 100% (with
a jump from 0 below the need threshold to 100 at and above the threshold).
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Figure 2: Average marginal changes in justice ratings in Needs treatment
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The overwhelming majority of participants, by contrast, do see shades of gray
but nevertheless increase their justice evaluations most when the endowment
reaches the need threshold.
Therefore, the S-shaped function still remains to be explained. In some
ways, sufficientarianism focuses on a reference point for evaluating good and
bad. As is known from the large field of judgment and decision making in
social psychology, reference points can make preferences reference-dependent
and decisions prone to biases. Indeed, the S-shaped function we found looks
akin to the value function, which is a crucial ingredient of prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The study participants may have considered
the endowments beyond the need threshold as the gain domain and endow-
ments below the threshold as the loss domain. The value function, which is
based on the relativity of perception, suggests concavity in the gain domain
and convexity in the loss domain, resulting in an (inverted) S-shaped function.
To test the reference-dependency conjecture, we look at the results of the
control treatment (NoNeeds), in which no information on needs was given.
Strikingly, justice evaluations are almost perfectly linear and cross the justice
evaluations of the Needs treatment when endowments reach the threshold.
A repeat of the regression analyses in Table 1 for the NoNeeds treatment
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shows no evidence either of convexity below the threshold but, more surpris-
ingly, of (mild) concavity as the linear combination of coefficients (-.0042) is
statistically significantly negative (p = .005, see Table 2 in the Appendix).
Statistical tests reveal that justice evaluations are (weakly) significantly dif-
ferent between the two treatments up to an endowment of 1,400 units.2
Figure 3: Mean justice evaluations across treatments
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Comparison with the control treatment supports the conjecture that partic-
ipants' evaluations are driven by reference dependency. Sure enough, however,
the NoNeeds treatment is different from the Needs treatment in more ways
than just the threshold. In the Needs treatment, subjects know that 1,000
units mean living in close quarters, whereas no such benchmark is available
in the NoNeeds treatment.
To find out whether participants imagined different sizes of living space
when rating the scenarios, a post-experimental question elicited how much
living space per person in square meters participants associated with the ficti-
tious amount of 1,000 units. Interestingly, while Figure 3 shows that there are
clearly differences in the distribution, there is still a large overlap (note that
2The p-values are smaller than .01 apart from when endowment is 0 (p = .07), 120 (p =
.011) and 140 (p = .032). The p-values are considerably larger than .1 for endowments
larger than 140.
11
the CDF is cut at .8 for reasons of visibility as the distributions are heavily
right-skewed in both treatments). Strikingly, the median is exactly the same
in both treatments: 25 square meters. Since 25 square meters per person are
a non-trivial amount of living space, in particular for a student population,
this also shows that the S-shaped function cannot plausibility be driven by
problems of divisibility, i.e., that living space below the need threshold is so
small as not to be usable.
Figure 4: Cumulative density function of associated living space by treatment
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
cu
m
ul
at
iv
e 
de
ns
iti
y 
fu
nc
tio
n
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Associated living space per person in square meters
Needs NoNeeds
Despite the fact that subjects had a similar association of living space in
real-world units, the need threshold not only changed the relationship between
endowment and justice ratings, it also tends to make participants' ratings more
coherent in an inter-subjective sense. We find that the variance between the
evaluations of different participants are significantly smaller in the Needs
treatment than in the NoNeeds treatment for endowments up to 600 (the
p-value of a variance ratio test is .022 for an endowment of 600 and < .001 be-
low). In this range of considerable undersupply with living space, participants
agree to a larger extent in the Needs compared to the control treatment that
this situation is unjust. The only other statistically significant difference in
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variance is found for the maximum endowment of 2,000, where partipants' rat-
ings are more coherent in the NoNeeds treatment. In order to compare the
coherence between the treatments across all levels of endowment, we also look
at the panel-level standard deviation of the panel Tobit regressions (see Table
1 and 2), which is significantly higher in the NoNeeds treatment than in the
Needs treatment. This means that there is more variance at the level of the
participantsless inter-subjective agreementin the Needs treatment than
in the NoNeeds treatment.
5 Discussion
Taken together, the evidence strongly points to needs providing a reference
point relative to which justice is evaluated. What remains to be discussed
further is whether this reference dependency is normatively undesirable. As
noted earlier, sufficientarianism strongly argues for such a reference point but
has at the same time received much flak for it. The criticism focuses on the
implication that the well-being of those who are relatively well off (close to
the sufficiency line) should be prioritized relative to those who are far away
from sufficiency. It has to be said that this study cannot reveal whether
participants would support this implication as we explicitly focused on the
noncomparative dimension of need-based justice. It also remains to be studied
whether the apparent reference dependency of justice evaluations also mean
biases in judgment and decision making, as was shown in other domains in a
myriad of academic work since Kahnemann and Tversky opened this field. In
terms of political consequences, one may fear that reference dependency leads
to the lot of the poorest in society not receiving the attention they would
otherwise get. There is indeed somealbeit debatedevidence along these
lines, sometimes summarized as Director's law (Stigler, 1970, for a discussion
see Feld and Schnellenbach, 2007; Pamp and Mohl, 2010), that public spending
largely benefits the middle class at the expense of both the rich and the poor.
It would be an important endeavor for future research to test for reference
dependency as a contributing factor.
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6 Extension and outlook: Needs as reference
points in the presence of comparative
(in)justice
In the preceding section, we highlighted some potential, normatively undesir-
able implications the reference dependency in justice perceptions might bring
about. In order to partly shed light on these, we now look into the results
of a related study (study 2). Study 2 is closely related to the present study
(henceforth study 1) and was run in the same subject pool with 117 partic-
ipants, who did not take part in study 1. It differs from study 1 only with
respect to the following elements: First, the wording of the text allows for
the possibility that endowment with living space might differ between house-
holds. Second, scenarios describe distributions of living space between four
representative households from different villages. Third, participants rate on
one screen, but separately, two different scenarios on the global scale that is
also used in study 1. Participants rated 30 different pairs of scenarios, i.e.,
60 scenarios in total, which were presented in a random order. The scenar-
ios are chosen in order to test for monotonicity and sensitivity of the justice
evaluation function below and above the threshold in the presence of inequal-
ity between households. Furthermore, by comparing the justice ratings in the
Needs treatment (Needs 2) to a control treatment with identical distributions
but no information on households' needs (NoNeeds 2), we can furthermore
test for the existence and the consequences of a reference point induced by
the need threshold when another reference point is available: the egalitarian
distribution among the homogeneous households.
In terms of the results, we start by splitting the scenarios into undersupply
and oversupply scenarios, i.e., those scenarios in the Needs 2 treatment in
which all four households have less or more living space, respectively, than
the need threshold. We then compare the evaluations in the Needs 2 treat-
ment to the evaluations in the control treatment, in which participants rated
the same distributions of living space but without any information on house-
holds' needs. Strikingly, the evaluations are almost indistinguishable and not
statistically different (p > .1, t-test at the level of the 117 independent ob-
servations) above the threshold, as is apparent from the boxplot of responses
displayed on the left side of Figure 5. By contrast, they are substantially and
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statistically significantly different (p < .001, t-test) below the threshold (see
also the box plot on the right side of the same figure). This again shows that
unfulfilled needs are seen as a source of injustice in its own right, i.e., beyond
the injustice of arbitrary inequality.
Figure 5: Boxplots of justice evaluations by treatment for oversupply and un-
dersupply scenarios
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Given the perceived injustice of unfulfilled needs and the convex relationship
between endowment and justice ratings found in study 1, do we find evidence
that participants would prioritize, in terms of their justice evaluations, the
relatively well-off compared to the poorer households? As it turns out, this
is not the case. Figure 6 depicts the difference in justice evaluations between
those pairs of scenarios that only differ in terms of inequality (i.e., differences
between scenarios can be described as rank-preserving transfers). Positive
values indicate that the more equal scenario was rated as more just.
The right side displays this difference for the undersupply scenarios and
shows that participants, on average, rate, in both treatments, the more equal
scenario as more just. If participants were to evaluate the scenarios in the
Needs 2 treatment purely based on the convex relationship between endow-
ment and justice found in study 1, we would expect the opposite: more un-
equal scenarios would be more just because bringing some households closer
to (or at) the need threshold would matter more than reduced need fulfill-
ment for those further away. When, therefore, in the absence of any reason
15
Figure 6: Boxplots of comparative injustice by treatment for oversupply and
undersupply scenarios
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to treat households differently, equality is available as a point of reference,
it dominates justice evaluations. However, this does not mean that need in-
formation does not matter. As the box plots on the right side also clearly
show, the perceived injustice of arbitrary inequality is considerably smaller (p
< .001, t-test at the level of the independent observations) in the Needs 2
treatmentfor undersupply cases. By contrast, for oversupply cases (see the
box plots on the left side), there is no such difference (p > .1, t-test). Hence,
equality (the comparative dimension) and need fulfillment (the noncompara-
tive dimension) interact, functioning as two reference points and again leading
to results that are normatively debatable: Surely, taking away from those who
have less than others should be considered more unjust when we also know
that these persons are needy. By contrast, however, the participants in our
study see the injustice of unjustified inequality as less severely in the Needs
2 treatment than in the NoNeeds 2 treatment. As in study 1, we also
find that inter-rater variance tends to be smaller in the Needs 2 treatment
compared to the NoNeeds 2 treatment: Whereas according to variance-ratio
tests the variance is significantly smaller in 13 scenarios in the Needs 2
treatment compared to the control treatment, the reverse only holds true in
four scenarios. In all remaining 45 scenarios, no significant difference can be
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detected. As in study 1, looking at the results of a panel Tobit regression
gives us a more general idea across all scenarios: Supporting the tendency
that the variance-ratio tests suggested, the panel-level standard deviation is
significantly smaller (p = .011, Wald test) in the Needs 2 treatment. This
means that the participants' idiosyncratic characteristics are less influential in
the Needs 2 treatment for determining justice evaluations, which are, hence,
more coherent when needs information are provided.
To conclude, the results of study 2 alleviate to some extent the concerns
raised in study 1 that participants would favor the relatively well-off at the
expense of the poorest. However, we find that unfulfilled needs compress
justice evaluations such that the additional injustice of arbitrary inequality
is judged less severely than without any information on unfulfilled needs.
This seems normatively problematic and warrants both further discussion and
inquiry into its antecedents and consequences.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Vignette Texts
7.1.1 Introduction Screen
Welcome to our study,
In this study on justice we are interested in your opinions and assessments.
Therefore we will present to you a number of varying scenarios, and we ask
you to imagine them as real. Please take the time to place yourself into the
scenarios and to come to your own personal assessment. In this study there
are no right or wrong answers.
We will assess your evaluations as well as the evaluations of all other par-
ticipants in this study. All data will be saved anonymously so that no details
can be attributed to any person. The results of the study will be published.
Thereby they will influence future research and shall be used to inform poli-
tics.
7.1.2 Vignette texts of the Needs and NoNeeds Treatments
The vignette texts of the Needs and NoNeeds treatments differ only on the
information given with regards to needs, which was left out in the NoNeeds
treatment, as is indicated in the following by square brackets.
Please imagine the following:
In the region of Bergtal a new village is going to be established. It is the
task of the Public Housing Association of Bergtal to build housing.
All households in this region want to live in the largest living space possible.
[The residents of the region have collectively decided on a minimum amount of
living space, under which living a decent life in this community is not possible.]
Between the households in the region there are no noteworthy differences
[and the minimum amounts are the same for each household: Each household
should have 1,000 regional  i.e. common to the region  area units of living
space in order to be able to live a decent life. To have a living space with the
equivalent area means for a household to live in close quarters, but it will be
just enough to lead a decent life].
There are enough means to be able to build up to 2,000 regional area units
of living space for each household. The Regional Parliament decides how much
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living space will actually be built for the residents of the new village. The
decision has otherwise no noteworthy consequences. For the construction of
living space no additional area would be consumed. The new village will be
built on the area of an old village that was abandoned after a fire destroyed
the houses.
In its decision the Regional Parliament wants to take into account how
impartial people  like you  judge the justice of different scenarios. Your task
is therefore to indicate for each scenario how just you hold the distribution of
living space to be.
7.1.3 Task Descriptions of the Needs and NoNeeds Treatments
Participants recived two different task descriptions, one for the justice evalu-
ations of the 11 scenarios each for themselfs and one for the pairwise evalua-
tions. The first task was describes as follows:
The following scenarios differ in how much living space shall be built for
each household according to the decision of the Regional Parliament.
Please indicate for each following distribution how just you regard it to
be. 100 percent means that you judge the distribution to be completely just.
Percentages close to 100 percent mean that you judge the distribution to be
almost completely just. Percentages far from 100 percent mean that you judge
the distribution to be significantly less just. Please familiarize yourself now
with each of the given distributions before answering the questions.
The second task was described as follows:
For this purpose on the coming pages we will present to you each time two
differing scenarios. We will ask you furthermore to indicate on a scale from
1 (equally just or unjust) to 11 (much more just) how just you regard each
scenario compared to the other one to be.
7.1.4 Vignette texts of the Needs 2 and NoNeeds 2 Treatments
The vignette texts of the Needs 2 and NoNeeds 2 treatments differ only
on the information given with regards to needs, which was left out in the
NoNeeds 2 treatment, as is indicated in the following by square brackets.
Please imagine the following:
In the region of Bergtal the new villages of Aytown, Beetown, Ceetown,
and Deetown are going to be established. It is the task of the Public Housing
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Association of Bergtal to build housing.
All households in this region want to live in the largest living space possible.
[The residents of the region have collectively decided on a minimum amount of
living space, under which living a decent life in this community is not possible.]
Between the households in the region there are no noteworthy differences
[and the minimum amounts are the same for each household: Each household
should have 1,000 regional  i.e. common to the region  units of living space
in order to be able to live a decent life. To live within the equivalent living
space means for a household to live in close quarters, but it will be just enough
to lead a decent life.]
There are enough means to be able to build up to 2,000 regional units of
living space for each household. The Regional Parliament decides how much
living space will actually be built for the residents of the new village. The
decision has otherwise no noteworthy consequences. For the construction of
living space no additional area would be consumed. The new village will be
built on the area of an old village that was abandoned after a fire destroyed
the houses.
7.1.5 Task Descriptions of the Needs 2 and NoNeeds 2
Treatments
The following scenarios differ in how much living space shall be built for each
household according to the decision of the Regional Parliament.
Please indicate for each following distribution how just you regard it to
be. 100 percent means that you judge the distribution to be completely just.
Percentages close to 100 percent mean that you judge the distribution to be
almost completely just. Percentages far from 100 percent mean that you judge
the distribution to be significantly less just. Please familiarize yourself now
with each of the given distributions before answering the questions.
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7.2 Individual-level justice evaluations in Needs
treatment
Figure 7: Justice evaluations by each participant (Needs treatment)
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7.3 Regression of justice evaluations in NoNeeds
treatment
model 1 model 2
variables justice evaluation justice evaluation
endowment 0.604*** 0.671***
(0.0201) (0.0789)
not above threshold * endowment 0.0617** 0.430***
(0.0309) (0.141)
endowment2 -0.000143
(0.000394)
not above threshold * endowment2 -0.00402***
(0.00144)
constant -9.818 -16.65**
(6.237) (6.895)
panel level standard deviation 43.01*** 43.45***
(4.744) (4.812)
standard deviation of the error term 23.21*** 23.20***
(0.924) (0.925)
observations 649 649
number of participants 59 59
standard errors in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
Table 2: Panel Tobit Regression (NoNeeds treatment)
7.4 Overview of scenarios in study 2
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